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The Implications of Kierkegaard's Separation of Faith 
and Reason
by Erin Stevens
Many philosophers have dedicated a significant amount of 
their time to proving the existence of God through both a 
priori and a posteriori arguments. However, Robert Adams 
suggests that Søren Kierkegaard views the efforts of these 
philosophers to have been in vain, because faith and 
objective reasoning are not compatible. To see why he 
asserts this, we will first look at Kierkegaard's conception of 
both faith and objective reasoning. Then, using these to 
understand his arguments for why a separation between 
these must occur, we will then examine the potentially dire 
implications this may have for society and why, at the same 
time, this is beneficial to religion. 
Before we can examine the aforementioned 
implications of the separating of religious faith from 
objective reasoning, we must establish why the two are 
inherently incompatible. It helps to first identify what 
Kierkegaard 's idea of religious faith actually entails and 
what he means by “objective reasoning”. For him, “faith 
must be decisive”—the establishment of it should be a 
resolution, which by definition implies that one does away 
with any doubts that may have been previously held 
(Adams 2). And this exclusion of doubt needs to be a 
conscious, fully informed decision made by the holder of 
faith—i.e. this believer has to be aware of this chance of 
error that he or she has chosen to disregard. In addition, 
he thinks that “in all genuine religious faith the believer is 
infinitely interested in the object of his faith” and that “the 
most essential and most valuable feature of religiousness 
is passion” (Adams 2, 7). From these two premises, the 
conception of an “infinitely passionate interest” can be 
formed and according to Kierkegaard, must be the kind of 
interest one has in religious faith. The nature of this infinite 
passion can be better understood once we have 
established that faith and reason are incompatible and thus 
will later be explained in further detail on page four. For 
now, it is important to simply understand that having an 
infinitely passionate interest in something means that the 
importance we deem it to have has no limit. Our other 
concern thus far is the sense in which “objective reasoning” 
is used. According to Adams, objective reasoning is 
reasoning with a conclusion that is deemed to be “true or 
probably true” by “every (or almost every) intelligent, fair-
minded, and sufficiently informed person” (Adams 1). This 
simply means that it has to be sufficiently supported by 
evidence to the point where it can be clearly and widely 
accepted as a truth. With the aforementioned background 
information in mind, we can now look at the arguments that 
Adams sees Kierkegaard providing  for why one cannot 
reason objectively to confirm religious faith. 
For the first argument, which Adams refers to as 
Kierkegaard's “Approximation Argument”, it should be 
noted that Kierkegaard works under the assumption that “a 
system of religious beliefs might be objectively probable” 
(Adams 7). This, of course, is not what he truly believes 
and is used here “only for the sake of argument” (Adams 
7). The argument begins with the notion that all historical 
facts contain some chance of error and therefore, “the 
greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything 
historical is merely an approximation” (as cited in Adams 1-
2). This can be better illustrated with Adams' Civil War 
example. There is, according to Kierkegaard's argument, a 
very small probability that we are wrong in asserting that 
the American Civil War occurred. However, we can still say 
that we do indeed “know” that the Civil War occurred 
because this possibility of error is so small that deeming it 
to be a serious concern would be unnecessary. This is the 
Civil War though, for which, unlike religious faith, we do not 
have an infinitely passionate interest. When it comes to 
something we are infinitely passionate about, any 
possibility of error is significant because there is no limit to 
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how important the matter is to us. If we are now to recall 
Kierkegaard's conception of faith, we notice that there is a 
contradiction here—because of our infinite interest in the 
object of faith, any possible error is significant to us, but 
faith is a decisive act, which requires us to extinguish these 
errors. Therefore, in having faith, one is disregarding these 
possible errors, taking “a 'leap' beyond the evidence” and 
this leap “cannot be justified by objective reasoning” 
(Adams 3). 
In continuing with the issues that lie in objective 
historical reasoning that were the basis for the 
Approximation Argument, we can understand what Adams 
calls the Postponement Argument. In relation to the idea 
that all historical “facts” carry some doubt, Kierkegaard 
says that we are always still tweaking the “answers” that 
we have thus far for historical inquiries and therefore to try 
to support or confirm one's own faith with historical facts 
would be an endless waiting game. There is always the 
possibility of something that we deem to be true now, 
changing some time in the future, causing someone to 
suspend his or her faith forever. This suspension would 
occur because faith for Kierkegaard must be a decisive 
commitment—a genuine believer cannot be one who will 
abandon their faith under any circumstances. Therefore the 
option of one declaring their belief only to later change it 
when new evidence surfaces is off the table because this 
person would not be a genuine believer—they are not 
“totally committed to the belief” (Adams 6). So from this we 
can say that one with genuine faith would not abandon said 
faith under any circumstances. But if the evidence that one 
is objectively basing their belief on ends up being edited in 
the future, they would still have to hold to their belief, which 
now is not based solely on the objective reasoning, for this 
reasoning has now been revised. According to Adams, this 
situation tells us that authentic beliefs cannot “depend 
entirely” on any objective reasoning that has the chance of 
being revised in the future (Adams 6). This then seems to 
point us towards a search for objective reasoning that does 
not contain such a chance, but as we concluded before, all 
empirical objective reasoning contains the possibility of 
needing to be revised in the future. Therefore, we arrive at 
the conclusion that “authentic religious faith cannot without 
error be based on any objective empirical reasoning” 
(Adams 6). Here, just like in the previous argument, 
Kierkegaard illustrates that faith cannot be based on 
reason due to the nature of objective reasoning and its 
constant editing and uncertainty and the practice of 
authentic faith needing to be a commitment. 
With these last two arguments, Kierkegaard was 
working through them on the assumption that religious faith 
can be based in objective reasoning in order to illustrate all 
of the technical problems with this idea. However, in this 
argument, which Adams calls the “Passion Argument”, 
Kierkegaard argues objective reasoning is not only useless 
to religion, “but inimical to religion's true interests” (Adams 
7). As it was mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard views faith as 
“the highest passion in a man”, therefore implying that 
nothing other than this passion is attainable. When we see 
how one may attempt to utilize objective reasoning to 
support his or her faith, it seems to be suggesting that 
something more than this mere infinite passion, i.e. 
“probabilities and guarantees”, can be attained (Adams 7). 
But for Kierkegaard, religious belief “ought to be based on 
a strenuous exertion of the will—a passionate striving”, 
therefore making objective reasoning undesirable to 
religion primarily due to religion's necessity for infinite 
passion (Adams 7). From this, Adams says Kierkegaard 
would conclude that objective improbability must be 
present in an infinite passion. Because passion is the most 
important component to religious belief, religious belief 
therefore necessitates objective improbability. Adams 
postulates that for Kierkegaard's argument, this objective 
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improbability that is demanded is that of at least one belief 
that would have to follow or must be true upon the 
attainment of religious passion (Adams 8). 
We said that an infinite passion requires objective 
improbability and we can examine some more reasons for 
why Kierkegaard asserts this. For one, if something is 
objectively improbable, there is great risk in believing it to 
be true because, objectively, it is most likely not true. 
Passion, in most senses, is an intense feeling or emotion 
for something, but since we are talking about an infinite 
passion, we need some sort of system to measure the 
intensity of a passion in order to comprehend what an 
infinite one might be. Using the definition of passion, we 
would look at determining how intense a strong emotion for 
something is and the best way to do this is to examine the 
actions it would produce. Kierkegaard suggests that 
looking at the amount of risk one takes in achieving 
something demonstrates the level of passion one has for 
that something. He would say that someone who risks 
more than someone else to achieve the same thing would 
therefore have more passion for that thing. Having 
established that risk and passion are directly proportional, 
we can conclude that the highest possible passion, which 
is needed for authentic religious faith, would be 
demonstrated by risking as much as possible. To risk as 
much as possible, there needs to be “the smallest possible 
chance of success” when one is trying to attain something, 
and the attaining of this end must involve “the greatest 
possible sacrifices” (Adams 9). And since this passion is 
described as being “infinite”, “there is no sacrifice so great 
one will not make it, and no chance of success so small 
one will not act on it” (Adams 9). When one is using 
objective reasoning, one is trying to minimize risk, thus 
making objective reasoning harmful to the very nature of 
authentic religious belief, which we have just shown to 
require the greatest amount of risk.
Going through Kierkegaard's arguments allows us 
to see why he believes that objective reasoning and 
religion, in principle, must exist in separate spheres, but 
what are the implications of this separation? If religion 
cannot be based on objective reasoning, it seems that it 
would be based on a passion that is subjective. With 
subjectivity, we of course lose any uniformity and without 
any objective or uniform conceptions in religion, we cannot 
say that anyone's faith in something is incorrect so long as 
they feel a genuine, infinite passion for this faith. This starts 
to become worrisome when we consider the immense 
number of individual minds, which include all kinds of 
variation in thought processes, level of sanity, and any 
other factor that is seen in variation throughout mankind. 
With a large number of different thinkers and a doctrine 
that claims religious faith is achieved through genuine 
passion, we have a pretty large probability of this 
manifesting itself in some dangerous ways. Numerous 
leaders of cults throughout the past have appeared to be 
genuinely convinced that they have received a message 
from God, which many times has been a message that 
does harm to other people. If we accept Kierkegaard's 
definition of faith and its separation from reason, can we 
not protest these harmful views a person might have? It 
seems that this would have to be the case. This separation 
of reason and faith appears to be beneficial to religion, for 
it allows one to cater to what one passionately feels, even 
if it is slightly different from the ideas of established 
religion. It can result in a more authentic and personalized 
form of faith. However, we must not forget that this 
personalization has the potential to result in some ugly 
scenarios, so both the benefits it provides to religion and 
the possible negative consequences for society should 
both be kept in mind when examining this separation of 
faith from objective reasoning.
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